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$32.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.
Reviewed by Laura A. Heymann

The field of "law as literature"' has been well plowed. The
movement gained force in the mid-1980s, led by James Boyd White, 2
among others, and has attracted many adherents, both among academics
and in the judiciary. Judge Richard Posner, a member of both groups,
has written forcefully on the literary qualities of opinions, most often to
decry the use of law clerks as ghostwriters and the use of footnotes as
repositories of anything other than bibliographical information.3 More
recently, the "law as literature" movement has led to a broader exploration of narrative in the law, of how the need to tell stories is at the
heart of most, if not all, legal endeavors.4
William Domnarski, an attorney and writer, is no stranger to the
field, having written of Shakespeare and Billy Budd in the context of the
"law and literature" movement.5 His latest work, In the Opinion of the
Court, is his attempt to fill what he perceives to be a void in the
scholarship: the lack of a "comprehensive study of the opinions that
judges ... have labored at in interpreting our statutes and our
Constitution" (p. 1). Opinions, Domnarski writes, "have not been
analyzed as a literary form, as communications between the court and
society.... I hope to change that with this book" (p. 2). While
Domnarski is not the first to consider opinions as a literary genre,6 his
book is a lively collection of lists and statistics that is free of the jargon
1. Law as literature has been distinguished from law in literature (both of which constitute the
field of law and literature); as one writer has described them, "'law in literature' examines the
possible relevance of literary texts, particularly those which present themselves as telling a legal
story, as texts appropriate for study by legal scholars .... 'Law as literature,' on the other hand, seeks
to apply the techniques of literary criticism to legal texts." IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE:
POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (1995).
2. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
oF THE LAw (1985). White has been called "a founder of law and literature studies." Robert A.
Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 201, 201 n.l (1990).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 140-57 (1996 ed.).
4. See, e.g., LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
5. See William Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 67 CoNN. BAR J. 317 (1993); William
Domnarski, Law-Literature Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd, 34 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 702 (1984).
6. For example, Robert Ferguson's often-cited work on judicial opinions as a literary genre,
supra note 2, fails to gamer a mention.
761

HeinOnline -- 85 Cal. L. Rev. 761 1997

CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

762

[Vol. 85:761

that might have bogged down another literary analysis. In the end,
however, the issues Domnarski raises, while important, are never fully
explored. As a brief introduction to judicial opinion writing, In the
Opinion of the Court hits the mark; as a "comprehensive study," the
book doesn't quite live up to its potential.
By the end of the book, two themes emerge: the issue of authorial
control and the question of audience. Authorial control is always a
concern when an intermediary exists between writer and reader. Usu~
ally, this is an editor or publisher; the West Publishing Company fills
this role for judicial opinions. Domnarski thus focuses initially on the
issue of publication. In chapter 1, "Reporting and Publishing Judicial
Decisions," he traces the familiar tale of how a lawyer from
Philadelphia named Dallas convinced the Supreme Court in the late
1700s to let him act as the unofficial reporter. Neither he nor his sue~
cessor, Cranch, were particularly skilled at the endeavor: the reports were
published late, incomplete, and filled with errors (pp. 6-7). The quality
improved ,vhen Wheaton began adding scholarly commentary in 1816,
but the venture did not become a profitable one until Peters added
headnotes and sold the volumes containing condensed versions of all
previous opinions (pp. 7-9). No doubt piqued by Peters's success,
Wheaton filed suit, claiming that Peters had violated his copyright in
opinions that he had reported. The Court, in Wheaton v. Peters,' held
that no copyright existed in its opinions, thus opening the door to com~
peting reporters, most notably the West Publishing Company, which is
responsible for publishing most of the judicial opinions in this country.
It wasn't until 1922 that the U.S. government assumed publication of
Supreme Court opinions; Domnarski notes, "The Court now controlled
its own product and established, after 130 years, its own means of com~
munication with the country" (p. 17). This is not the case, however,
with lower federal courts, most of which have no official reporter and
thus no one to "break the stranglehold West Publishing has on the ac~
tual content of the opinions it publishes by interposing a facilitator act~
ing on the court's behalf' (pp. 28-29).
The risk of alteration, though, slight as it is, seems to me to be a less
interesting issue than other benefits that might arise from control, which
go unexplored. How, for example, might the Court use its control over
publication to better disseminate opinions that are intended to be read
by the general public? Has West's system of headnotes and the
prevalence of electronic publication, both of which allow researchers to
jump directly to the pertinent parts of the opinion, frustrated the literary
aspirations of judges? And what lessons can be learned from examples
of control in other literary forms: the editor of a long-dead author's
7.

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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novel, for example? These are, of course, not the only questions that
could be explored, but an analysis of the role of publishers in shaping
judicial opinions seems to require something more than mere history.
For most appellate opinions, authorial control is further undermined by an additional intermediary: the law clerk, who is often given
the task of drafting opinions. Domnarski highlights the debate, beginning in the 1950s and continuing today, over the influence law clerks
should have in judicial decision making and the implications of their
role for analysis of opinions: "[O]ur discussions of who the Justices are
and what their opinions mean are so falsely premised that they lose intellectual respectability" (p. 41). Because we can't be sure to whom the
words we read belong, the entire effort to discuss judicial opinions as a
literary genre is undermined. Without an author around whom to center
the writing, Domnarski suggests, an analysis of style becomes aimless.
Nevertheless, chapter 2, "Who Writes Judicial Opinions," and chapter 3,
"Style and Substance in Supreme Court Opinions," both focus on the
internal aspects of opinions-language and style-rather than on opinions as literary products. Domnarski is solidly in Judge Posner's camp
here in decrying the blandness and similarity of many judicial opinions.
This, he claims, stems from two sources. First, because law clerks write
many of the opinions coming out of federal courts (pp. 30-31, 38-44),
and because these clerks are "almost always" recent law review editors
who have been trained to write in "law reviewese," the opinions are
usually "colorless, scholarly in the sense of citing many cases as precedent for each and every principle of law, and extensively footnoted" (p.
57). Second, the necessity of gaining a majority means that opinion
writers have to appeal to their colleagues, who may have slightly different views about how an issue should be decided. Justice Douglas, for
example, noted that opinions "are sometimes so opaque or irrational
perhaps, in the sense of not being logical developments structurally ... because of the patchwork that goes into their creation, satisfying
this judge, getting a majority by putting in a footnote, striking out a
sentence that would have made a paragraph lucid ..." (p. 34). Free
from these concerns, the writer of a concurrence or a dissent can be
more flamboyant and provide "relief from the tedium" (p. 58). The
difference in control is illustrated in the attributions that precede opinions. The author of the majority opinion, although identified, is always
delivering the "opinion of the Court," in which the pronoun "we" is
used; the author of the concurrence or dissent retains the honor individually-he or she may be joined by other Justices but is always
speaking for himself or herself, using "!."8
8. But see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES, supra
note 4, at 188: "[A]ssignment of individual responsibility invites the onlooker to become all too aware
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The discussion of the stylistic appeal of opinions also highlights the
issue of audience. Domnarski's most salient point-although it is a
rather thin thread drawn throughout the book-is that opinions work
best when they are written with a broad, lay audience in mind (p. 88).
"The connection between the medium and the message in the Supreme
Court's work," he writes, "was especially clear in the fifties and sixties.
Opinions resolving issues of important individual rights tended to be
shorter than the usual opinion and were more directly aimed at the average reader" (p. 70). Thus Brown v. Board of Education9 was intentionally kept short (fourteen paragraphs) and in simple language, so that the
general public, most of whom would be affected by the decision, could
understand it (pp. 70, 82). 10 By contrast, the output of the Court's
nineteenth-century Justices is less readable, due in part to the fact that
their opinions "had little dissemination and received even less critical
commentary to guide them" (p. 62) -in ~hort, they were not part of a
public dialogue.
Thus, the delegation of opinion writing to clerks not only diminishes authorial control but also engenders a distancing between writer
and audience. In chapters 4 through 6, Domnarski explores examples
of opinions in which this distance has been shortened. The eleven
opinions of Domnarski's "canon" in chapter 4 are all Supreme Court
opinions that establish or augur "an important rule ... affecting a fundamental aspect .. . of the American democracy or the American way
of life ... with clarity, conviction, or eloquence" (p. 77) .11 Chapter 5,
"Style and Substance in Lower Federal Court Opinions," moves
quickly through various examples of notable stylists, including Judges
Hand, Kozinski, and Selya (of whom Domnarski says, "He consistently
and frequently uses obscure diction, for no other apparent reason than
to show off' (p. 106)), but pauses at none of these long enough to offer much in the way of analysis. And chapter 6, "Closing the Circle,"
is Domnarski's paean to Posner, an opinion writer who has "close[d]
of the importance of assignment practices within the Court because of the potentially different styles
and approaches associated with the particular members of the Court."
9. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
10. This point is also made by Sanford Levinson, see Levinson, supra note 8, at 198.
11. Domnarski' s canon includes, in order, McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579
(1952); Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Domnarski has likely taken his cue from Judge Posner, who
noted in his landmark work, Law and Literature, that he left to "lawyers, judges, and law professors"
the task of constructing the "canon of 'leading' cases." RICHARD A. PoSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 20 (1988).

HeinOnline -- 85 Cal. L. Rev. 764 1997

1997]

BOOKS RECENED

765

the gap between reader and writer" through various techniques, including addressing the reader directly (p. 124)}2
The relationship between opinion and audience is an important
consideration, and one that has been addressed by several other writers. 13
But Domnarski leaves unsaid (at least in the pages of this book) that
perhaps not every opinion is designed to be read by the general public;
that, in fact, each opinion has multiple audiences} 4 The attempt to appeal to many or all of these audiences simultaneously is in part what
causes the incoherence of which Domnarski complains. Writing for a
lay audience's understanding has its appeal, but it may not always be
appropriate. Strong arguments have been made for positioning the litigants as the primary audience; they are, after all, the ones for whom the
opinion has immediate meaning and thus deserve a complete and detailed response to their arguments. "By demonstrating to litigants and
lawyers that they have been heard," Judge Becker has asserted, "written
opinions reinforce the bar's confidence in the bench and enhance the
legitimacy of the judicial process in the eyes of the people." 15 The litigants in the particular case and their lawyers might be the primary audience, but there are others, including other courts that might review the
case, other courts that review similar cases, the legislature that drafted the
statute at issue, lawyers, academics, and law students. Opinions are
"communications between the court and society," to be sure, but society is multilayered; Domnarski' s book would have benefited greatly
from a consideration of those layers.

12. Unfortunately, Domnarski slightly undercuts the evidence for these arguments. He works
to establish a canon of judicial opinions in chapter 4, laying out six determinative factors and eleven
qualifying opinions but admits that "not all of the cases of the canon meet all of the criteria I set out
earlier" (pp. 87-88). (Domnarski attempts to deflect this criticism by attributing it to "readers keen on
detecting inconsistencies, discrepancies, and ambiguities-lawyers, for example.") In chapter 6, he
quotes a Posner opinion in full in order to "illustrateD Posner's methodology" only to conclude after
seven pages that it "is in some ways not the best example of a Posner opinion. He is not as colloquial
and there is little figurative language here. And as for tone, there is not as much of the whirlwind
flavor and glee that infects so many of Posner's other opinions ..." (pp. 136-43).
13. Judge Posner explored this relationship in a 1995 article and reached similar conclusions.
See Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?). 62 U. CHI. L REV. 1421,
1429-30 (1995) (contrasting "pure" judicial opinions, written for lawyers, which are long-winded,
solemn, impersonal, and predictable, with "impure" judicial opinions, written for laypersons, which
are bold, conversational, fresh, and enjoyable).
14. As Professor Schauer has noted, the general public might be at the bottom of this list
"[O]rdinary people simply do not read judicial opinions." Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62
U. CHI. L REV. 1455, 1463 (1995). It is doubtful, although open to debate, whether this would
change if opinions were written with lay audiences in mind.
15. Edward R. Becker,/n Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH U. LQ. I, 3 (1996). See also Patricia
M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L REV. 1451, 1453 (1995) (countering Posner's
criticism of nonliterary opinions by asserting that litigants are the primary audience for judicial
opinions).
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Instead, too much of the book is taken up by statistics and facts that
make for interesting reading but stray from the book's mission. Much
of chapter 2, for example, is spent listing the credentials of various sitting judges, including which ones are members of Phi Beta Kappa and
which were law review editors (a dubious honor, given Domnarski's
earlier critique). Many pages are spent in chapter 5 collating statistics
on lower federal court opinions: the number of criminal cases, the various statutes challenged, the number of words in published opinions.
Domnarski's research is impressive, and could serve as the foundation
for a literary analysis, but it has been underutilized in this book.
There are, however, some useful thoughts on the process of opinion
writing to be found in Domnarski' s book. He quotes Justice Holmes,
who, in a letter to diplomat Lewis Einstein, wrote, "[m]y only serious
interest when I first got here a week ago was to have my work for the
term bound up in a little volume as I do each year. Until that is done
the term is not closed. Then it becomes history and I can hold eight
months of my life in my hand and look it over" (p. 35). Domnarski
presents this quotation merely as evidence of Holmes's writing habits,
but the connection it makes between publication and authority is ripe
for exploration. Another such thought comes from Justice Jackson,
who noted, "[u]ntil Cardozo's time, there was a suspicion among lawyers of any lawyer who wrote too well. It was almost believed that a
good literary style was evidence of poor legal craftsmanship" (p. 67).
Anecdotes such as these make for entertaining reading and suggest
the richness of the material available for analysis. What Domnarski' s
book seems to be missing, however, is any probing consideration of the
whole. If judicial opinions are to be seen as a literary form, how does
that form compare with or borrow from other literary genres? Is the art
of ghostwriting an independently analyzable style? 16 Is Posner's
"closing the gap" by addressing the reader directly simply a twentiethcentury form of the Victorian novelist's "Dear Reader''? Do legal aficionados await forthcoming Supreme Court opinions much as Dickens
fans awaited the arrival of the next installment of Bleak House? And
why do we have literary expectations for judicial opinions and not for

16. The Nancy Drew series, for example, which carried the author's name of "Carolyn
Keene," was written by several writers over the years, all conforming to a specific style. See Susan
Chira,HarrietAdams Dies; Nancy Drew Author Wrote 200Nove/s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1982, at AI,
B 11. But see Joseph Vining, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief, 86 MtCH. L REV. 577, 590
(1987): "[J]ust as literary critics feel foolish in applying elaborate techniques of literary analysis to
segments of a book that tum out to have been ghostwritten by an editor, lawyers simply have to have
difficulty reading ghostwritten texts as if they were authentie." Vining's assertion, of course, leaves
open the question of what "authentic" means.
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other government writings, such as agency publications in the Federal
Register? 17
It is usually not very fruitful to criticize a book simply because it is
not the book one would have written or searched for on the subject.
And perhaps Domnarski's book will serve as the basis for a deeper exploration of the subject; he does, after all, describe the project as " a
general, comprehensive essay" (p. 2). In the Opinion of the Court
seems to be written for readers in other disciplines-those literature or
policy students who want a brief taste of how judicial opinions are written. Yet Domnarski concludes by calling for a consideration of judicial
opinions "without the edges of current critical theory" in order to recognize opinions as "legal literature that can soar to the level of literature generally" (p. 155)-in other words, to read opinions much as we
might read a novel or a particularly well-written magazine article. It's a
lofty and public-minded goal, and one that might inject a note of
democratic participation into what has often been seen as an antidemocratic process. But so long as opinions have an instrumental function,
such as resolving differences between litigants, it's a goal that may never
be fully realized.

17. As Professor Schauer has noted:
It is a routine charge against contemporary judicial opinions that they read more like
statutes than like opinions of a court....
• • • Yet those same commentators typically fail to castigate OSHA regulations as
uninteresting, do not worry about the lack of literary style in the Internal Revenue Code,
and are reluctant to complain about the intricate scheme of exceptions, definitions, parts,
and subparts in the Securities Act of 1933. Schauer, supra note 14, at 1455.
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